SUB Erste Lesung GmbH has set itself the task of supporting companies in the complex political and administrative arenas in Berlin and Brussels with experience and expertise in representing their interests.
The focus here is on monitoring public and political discourse as well as legislative developments, analyzing and processing them and developing strategies for the targeted positioning of clients.
Another aspect of political communication is direct contact with stakeholders and the active representation of interests on behalf of clients – a field of activity that is an indispensable part of strategic management consulting. Erste Lesung GmbH acts as an opinion leader in democratic decision- making processes. As the legitimacy of the institutions and players in this system is based on the trust of its citizens, we believe that any involvement in the decision-making process should be based on ethical standards.
The discussion about lobbying and the involvement of organized interests in political decision-making is yet not so advanced in Germany and the EU that we can simply adopt a standard.
Even the question of whether lobbying is justified is controversial in the public debate. This makes ethical discourse within our company and in dialog with our clients and political decision-makers more necessary.
Critics argue that Erste Lesung GmbH should limit itself to providing strategic advice to its clients and refrain from active lobbying or generally advise against it. However, we are convinced that lobbying is a legitimate and necessary element in the decision-making process of a democracy. However, we reject the idea of “backroom culture” and advocate a clear and transparent framework for action, considering the European Commission’s working methods presented in November 2014.
The fact that the interests of lobbyists from NGOs, companies and agencies are made comprehensible in an EU transparency register is therefore to be welcomed. There is still resistance to this, necessitating an open discussion between lobbyists, the EU institutions and their political decision-makers, employees and civil servants. In the absence of a uniform code of conduct, there are often major cultural differences in the way civil servants and employees deal with external lobbyists, as they are bound by various binding rules imposed by their governments. Politically elected decision-makers, on the other hand, are usually only responsible within their political group or themselves when deciding which relationships, they maintain with interest representatives. In doing so, however, they are faced with a critical public that often regards close contact with interest representatives as amoral, while conversely a defensive attitude is easily associated with a lack of willingness to engage in discussion.
The term stakeholder refers to all officeholders, elected officials as well as (their) employees in the political sphere, i.e., all persons who are paid by the state (i.e., from taxpayers’ money) for their activities. In the area of legislation, this includes all members of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, the state parliaments, parliamentary groups, and members of parliament; in government and administration, it includes members of the federal and state governments, ministries and state administrations. They also include employees of courts, trade unions and public companies. At EU level, this includes all official mandate holders and employees in the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the European Court of Justice, the Committee of the Regions and other advisory bodies and European agencies.
This compliance guideline sets out the legal framework and the maxims for action derived from it for consulting activities when dealing with stakeholders.
The motive of strategic management consultancy for political communication is to support clients in realizing their interests and to work as closely as possible to their interests while taking ethical and moral standards into account. In this respect, the independence and integrity of the consultants are indispensable criteria to avoid conflicts of interest and objectives and to meet the client’s demands for integrity and confidentiality.
The growing complexity and increasing demands on political institutions and decision-makers make it necessary to involve external players with specific expertise to be able to make targeted and effective policies. Management consultancies sometimes take on the role of such actors. They combine the expertise of companies with that of the political process and optimize the positioning of the respective stakeholders in the complex political system.
This advisory activity is highly dependent on trust, contacts, and information. For example, it must be clear which stakeholder will influence a regulatory measure that is being drawn up and at what point in time. If a dialog then takes place between the stakeholder and the company concerned, it must also be possible to trust that various scenarios of the regulatory measure are presented truthfully. Only if this requirement is met will the management consultancy be credible as a mediator and enable a targeted debate on positions and political proposals.
As political decisions are usually made under public scrutiny and under highly competitive pressure, political consulting therefore requires a high degree of sensitivity, transparency and professional Ǫuality to avoid potential conflict situations from the outset. For example, a politician must be able to defend to his political leadership and the public the incorporation of business interests into the text of a policy proposal, just as a company director must be able to defend to his employees and the board a failure of his dialog efforts that paves the way for a political measure that can be devastating for the business.
The following rules of conduct are binding f o r SUB Erste Lesung GmbH. Non- compliance by employees will have consequences up to and including dismissal.
1. Legal basis
The profession of political advisor is always carried out in compliance with democratic principles. It is therefore important to maintain transparency and prevent opaque and unfair practices as well as corruption.
The legal basis for strategic policy advice is German federal law and EU standards.
At national level, these are:
The German Civil Code (BGB), regarding confidentiality
- § Section 242 (performance in good faith)
The debtor is obliged to effect performance in accordance with good faith and customary practice.
- § Section 280 Compensation for breach of duty
(1) If the debtor breaches an obligation arising from the contractual relationship, the creditor may demand compensation for any damages incurred. This does not apply if the debtor is responsible for the breach of duty.
(2) The creditor can only claim damages for delay in performance under the condition of § 286.
(3) The creditor can only claim damages in lieu of performance under the additional provisions of § 281, § 282 or § 283.
- § 823 Liability for damages
(1) Anyone who intentionally or negligently injures the life, body, health, freedom, or any other right of another person shall be obliged to compensate the other person for any damage incurred.
(2) The same obligation applies to anyone who violates a law intended to protect another person. If, according to the content of the law, a violation of this law is also possible without fault, the obligation to pay compensation only arises in the event of fault.
The Criminal Code StGB, in particular
• §Section 108e Corruptibility and bribery of public officials
(1) Any person who, as a member of a federal or state parliament, demands an unjustified advantage for himself or a third party in return for the promise or acceptance that he will perform or refrain from performing an act on behalf of or on the instructions of a third party in the exercise of his mandate shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty.
(2) Likewise, anyone who offers, promises, or grants a member of a federal or state parliament an unjustified advantage for that member or a third party in return for performing or refraining from performing an act on behalf of or on the instructions of that member in the exercise of his or her mandate shall be punished.
(3) The members referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 are equivalent to members
– a representative body of a local authority,
– a body elected by direct and universal suffrage of an administrative unit formed for a sub-region of a state or a local authority,
– of the Federal Assembly,
– of the European Parliament,
– a parliamentary assembly of an international organization and
– of a legislative body of a foreign state.
(4), an unjustified advantage does not exist if the acceptance of the advantage is in accordance with the provisions applicable to the member’s legal status. The following do not constitute an unjustified advantage.
– a political mandate or a political function and
– a donation permitted under the Political Parties Act or corresponding laws.
(5) In addition to a custodial sentence of at least six months, the court may disqualify the person from voting in public elections and from voting in public affairs.
- § Section 298 Agreements restricting competition in tenders
(1) Anyone who submits an offer in an invitation to tender for goods or commercial services that is based on an unlawful agreement aimed at inducing the organizer to accept a specific offer is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or a monetary penalty.
(2) The invitation to tender within the meaning of paragraph 1 shall be deemed equivalent to the award of a contract by private treaty following a prior call for competition.
(3) According to paragraph 1, also in conjunction with paragraph 2, anyone who voluntarily prevents the organizer from accepting the offer or the organizer from providing his service shall not be punished. If the offer is not accepted or the service is not provided by the organizer without any action on the part of the offender, he shall not be punished if he makes a voluntary and serious effort to prevent the acceptance of the offer or the provision of the service.
- § Section 299 Corruptibility and bribery in business dealings
(1) Anyone who, as an employee or agent of a business operation, demands an advantage for himself or a third party during business in return for the promise or assumption that he will unfairly favor another in the procurement of goods or commercial services in competition is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.
(2) Anyone who, during business, offers, promises or grants an employee or agent of a business establishment an advantage for the latter or a third party in return for unfairly favoring him or another in the purchase of goods or commercial services for the purposes of competition shall also be punished.
(3) Paragraphs 1 and 2 also apply to actions in foreign competition.
- §331 Acceptance of benefits
(1) A public official or a person with a special public service obligation who demands, accepts the promise of or accepts an advantage for himself or a third party in the performance of his duties is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty.
(2) A judge or arbitrator who demands an advantage for himself or a third party in return, allows himself to be promised or assumes that he has performed or will perform a judicial act is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. The attempt is punishable.
(3) The offence is not punishable under paragraph 1 if the offender allows himself to be promised or accepts a benefit not demanded by him and the competent authority, within the scope of its powers, has either approved the acceptance in advance or the offender reports the offence to it without delay and it approves the acceptance.
- § Section 332 Corruptibility
(1) A public official or a person with a special public service obligation who demands an advantage for himself or a third party in return, allows himself to be promised or accepts that he has performed or will perform an official act and has thereby violated or would violate his official duties is liable to a custodial sentence of six months to five years. In less serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for up to three years or a fine. The attempt is punishable.
(2) A judge or arbitrator who demands, allows himself to be promised or accepts an advantage for himself or a third party in return for the fact that he has performed or will perform a judicial act and has thereby violated or would violate his judicial duties is liable to a custodial sentence of one to ten years. In less serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment from six months to five years.
(3) If the offender demands, is promised, or accepts the benefit in return for a future act, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply even if he has shown his willingness to the other person,
- violate his duties in the act or,
2. insofar as the action is at his discretion, to allow himself to be
influenced by the advantage when exercising his discretion.
- § 333 Granting of advantages
(1) Any person who offers, promises, or grants an advantage to a public official, a person under special obligation for public service or a soldier of the German Armed Forces for the performance of his or her official duties shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty.
(2) Any person who offers, promises, or grants an advantage to a judge or arbitrator or a third party in return for the fact that he has performed or will perform a judicial act shall be punished with
Punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine.
(3) The act is not punishable under paragraph 1 if the competent authority, within the scope of its powers, has either previously authorized the acceptance of the benefit by the recipient or authorizes it upon immediate notification by the recipient.
- § Section 334 Bribery
(1) Anyone who offers, promises, or grants an advantage to a public official, a person with a special public service obligation or a soldier in the Bundeswehr in return for the fact that they have performed or will perform an official act and have thereby violated or would violate their official duties is liable to a custodial sentence of three months to five years. In less serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for up to two years or a fine.
(2) Anyone who offers, promises, or grants an advantage to a judge or arbitrator or a third party in return for performing a judicial act
- and thereby violated his judicial duties or
- in the future and would thereby violate his judicial duties,
is punishable by imprisonment of three months to five years in the cases under no. 1 and by imprisonment of six months to five years in the cases under no. 2. The attempt is punishable.
(3) If the offender offers, promises, or grants the advantage in return for a future act, subsections 1 and 2 shall already apply if he attempts to induce the other person to
- violates his duties in the act or,
- insofar as the action is at his discretion, is influenced by the advantage when exercising his discretion.
THE LAW AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION (UWG), IN PARTICULAR
- § Section 17 Betrayal of business and trade secrets
(1) Any person employed by a company who, during the term of the employment relationship, discloses a business or trade secret entrusted to him or m a d e accessible to him within the scope of the employment relationship to someone without authorization for the purpose of competition, for his own benefit, for the benefit of a third party or with the intention of causing damage to the owner of the company shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty.
(2) Likewise, anyone who acts for the purposes of competition, for their own benefit, for the benefit of a third party or with the intention of causing damage to the owner of the company will be punished,
- a business or trade secret is obtained by
- a) Use of technical means,
- b) Production of an embodied representation of the secret or
- c) unauthorized taking or securing of an object in which the secret is embodied, or
- uses a business or trade secret without authorization or discloses it to a third party, which he has obtained through one of the notifications referred to in paragraph 1 or through his own or a third party’s action in accordance with number 1 or which he has otherwise obtained or secured without authorization.
(3) The attempt is punishable.
(4) In particularly serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for up to five years or a fine. As a rule, a particularly serious case exists if the offender
- acts commercially,
2. knows at the time of notification that the secret is to be exploited abroad,
or
3. carries out recovery abroad itself in accordance with paragraph 2 no. 2.
(5) The offense will only be prosecuted upon application unless the prosecuting authority deems it necessary to intervene ex officio due to the special public interest in prosecution.
(6) § Section 5 No. 7 of the Criminal Code applies accordingly.
- §18 Utilization of templates
(1) Any person who, during business, makes unauthorized use of templates or instructions of a technical nature entrusted to him, in particular drawings, models, templates, patterns, recipes, for the purposes of competition or for his own benefit, or communicates them to someone else, shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding two years or to a monetary penalty.
(2) The attempt is punishable.
(3) The offense will only be prosecuted upon application unless the prosecuting authority deems it necessary to intervene ex officio due to the special public interest in prosecution.
(4) § Section 5 No. 7 of the Criminal Code applies accordingly.
THE FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION ACT (BDSG) ON DATA PROTECTION AND DATA SECURITY
- §4 Permissibility of data collection, processing, and use
(1) The collection, processing and use of personal data is only permitted insofar as this law, or another legal provision permits or orders this or the data subject has consented.
(2) Personal data must be collected from the data subject. It may only be collected without the data subject’s cooperation if
- a legal provision provides for this or makes it mandatory, or
- a) the nature of the administrative task to be performed or the business purpose makes it necessary to collect data from other persons or bodies, or
- b) the collection from the data subject would require a disproportionate effort and there are no indications that overriding interests worthy of protection of the data subject are impaired.
(3) If personal data is collected from the data subject, the data subject must be informed by the data controller of the following, unless the data subject has already gained knowledge by other means
- the identity of the controller,
2. the purposes of the collection, processing or use and - the categories of recipients only insofar as the data subject need not expect the data to be transferred to them in the circumstances of the individual case. If personal data is collected from the data subject based on a legal provision that obliges the data subject to provide information, or if the provision of information is a prerequisite for the granting of legal advantages, the data subject shall be informed of this, otherwise of the voluntary nature of his or her information. If required by the circumstances of the individual case or upon request, the data subject shall be informed of the legal provision and of the consequences of refusing to provide information.
- The Act on the Convention of December 17, 1997 on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Act on Combating International Bribery). §2 Bribery of foreign public officials in connection with international business transactions
(1) Any person who, with the intention of obtaining or securing for himself or a third party a mandate or an undue advantage in international business transactions, offers, promises or grants a member of a legislative body of a foreign state or a member of a parliamentary assembly of an international organization an advantage for that body or a third party in return for the fact that he will in future carry out an act or omission in connection with his mandate or duties shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty.
(2) The attempt is punishable.
At European level, SUB Erste Lesung GmbH is registered in the Transparency Register and has therefore undertaken to comply with the Code of Conduct and the rules and ethical principles contained therein. [2]
2. Responsibility
The employees of SUB Erste Lesung GmbH assume ethical responsibility for their actions in accordance with this guideline in the projects they manage.
3. Information
The Ǫuality of information and its validity is particularly important in the interaction between institutions, the media, and the public. Therefore, information that has been checked to the best of our knowledge and belief and found to be valid forms the basis of quality and target-oriented consulting activities. Misleading information that is knowingly false or incomplete is avoided.
4. Transparency
In order to ensure transparency and traceability of the interests we represent; our employees disclose the name of the client when making contact and in discussions with other stakeholders if they are acting on behalf of the client.
5. Discretion
In political consulting, it is important to maintain a delicate balance between confidentiality and the involvement of relevant stakeholders. The trust of the client forms the basis for the consultancy work. Confidential information and internal business matters are only disclosed with the consent of the client.
current or former client and data protection is guaranteed. This is also agreed in the confidentiality clause with contractors and employees, which is common to all our contracts.
6. Separation of interests and competencies
The employees of SUB Erste Lesung actively avoid conflicts of interest in the exercise of their profession. For example, when taking on political or institutional offices and tasks, it is important to avoid accusations or the risk of misuse of office or information. Overall, it is important to keep professional and private matters free of conflict, especially about friendly or partnership contacts.
If an office/voluntary position, a friendly relationship, or a partnership entails such a potential conflict of interest with competitors, stakeholders or customers, the employee will inform the company management immediately. On the other hand, the “strict separation of professional and private life” is a nonsensical demand in political business. To meet this requirement, a precise distinction would have to be made as to when a business contact begins to become a private friendship. It would also have to be stipulated whether, from a certain point onwards, it would no longer be possible to talk about work-related matters, etc. This is unrealistic. That is unrealistic.
Professional advancement in politics is very often based on a broad network that must be built up over years of extremely time-consuming private commitment. The private interest and thus the
Networks very often become relevant to work in the political arena. It would be wrong and hypocritical to prohibit the overlapping of the two spheres of private life and work. Rather, a mature and responsible culture of interaction within and between these two spheres is essential, while cultivating them freely and actively. The necessary overlap between the two spheres requires close and constant ethical scrutiny.
7. No unfair practices
The employees of SUB Erste Lesung do not resort to unfair or unlawful practices in the performance of their professional activities. No direct or indirect financial incentives or similar benefits are granted or promised to stakeholders in order to obtain information or influence decisions.
However, a distinction must be made between courtesies and relevant services and non-relevant favors:
For example, it is not necessarily a financial benefit to relieve stakeholders of work, grant them exclusive access to unrelated events or people, arrange a place in a daycare center or perform similar favors. It is not reprehensible to cultivate courtesies or increase interest through the Ǫuality of dialog. Thus, the description of a factual situation is naturally enhanced by a presentation or a visit in Ǫuality. For example, the presentation effect of trying out a technically complex product for two weeks or the helicopter flight over a site could be relevant and appropriate and justify the formal financial advantage.
However, extraneous favors have no place in a dialogue driven by the matter at hand.
In the case of invitations to meals, care is taken to ensure that the expenses for these correspond approximately to the expenses that the stakeholder would have incurred without the involvement of the consultant. As a rule, it is important to exercise restraint with invitations.
Tying arrangements, whereby services are only provided if another, unrelated service is purchased at the same time, are not practiced.
It is not necessarily unfair to ask for documents that are not public. For example, it sometimes happens that decisions are not published because they are only posted on the Internet weeks after the decision has been taken due to the sluggishness of institutions. We believe that political processes should be as transparent as possible unless higher interests such as internal security are at risk.
However, it is unfair and reprehensible to put undue pressure on stakeholders or to enter into agreements with customers that force employees to exert such pressure. We reject contractual agreements which, under the guise of “intelligence gathering”, also include “document hunting” in addition to the usual information gathering – the expectation of “obtaining” drafts of regulatory proposals as quickly as possible.
Through continuous case-by-case considerations, the employees of SUB Erste Lesung GmbH constantly ask themselves how they should behave in accordance with this guideline in situations that have not yet been anticipated. These are discussed and recorded internally, and the compliance guideline is further developed if necessary. At the same time, the company management undertakes not to sanction the reporting of such conflicts too negatively, but on the contrary to encourage them.
8. Bonus payments
SUB Erste Lesung GmbH rejects bonuses in the form of pure performance bonuses that are aimed at achieving a specific target and thus increase the pressure on employees or drive them to unfair practices.
Bonuses in the form of annual bonuses for package services, i.e., additional payments for customers satisfied with the full-year service, together with an appropriate salary, allow employees to work in a way that does not conflict with this policy.
9. Avoidance of conflicts of interest
If, despite all efforts to avoid conflicts of interest, a potentially conflicting situation arises where conflicting interests are represented at the same time, the client is informed directly, and a solution is worked out together.
10. Respect
The guarantee of high Ǫuality standards and goal-oriented consulting is based on respectful and open interaction between client and contractor as well as between the employees of SUB Erste Lesung.
For this reason, discriminatory statements, and actions in and in connection with the performance of consulting activities will not be tolerated and will be prevented.
11. Diversity Charter
The first reading stands by the wording of the “Diversity Charter” and will always act in recognition and promotion of potential through diversity in the specific questions on the topics mentioned therein.
The first reading stands by the wording of the “Diversity Charter” and will always act in recognition and promotion of potential through diversity in the specific questions on the topics mentioned therein.
WORDING OF THE CHARTER:
The diversity of modern society, influenced by globalization and demographic change, is shaping economic life in Germany. We can only be economically successful if we recognize and make use of the diversity that exists. This applies to the diversity of our workforce and the diverse needs of our customers and business partners.
The diversity of employees with their different skills and talents opens opportunities for innovative and creative solutions.
The aim of implementing the “Diversity Charter” in our organization is to create a working environment that is free of prejudice. All employees should be valued – regardless of gender, nationality, ethnic origin, religion or ideology, disability, age, sexual orientation, and identity. Recognizing and promoting this diverse potential creates economic benefits for our organization.
We create a climate of acceptance and mutual trust. This has a positive impact on our reputation with business partners and consumers, both in Germany and in other countries around the world.
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS CHARTER, WE WILL
- cultivate an organizational culture that is characterized by mutual respect and appreciation for each individual. We create the conditions for managers and employees to recognize, share and live these values. Managers and supervisors have a special obligation in this regard.
- review our HR processes and ensure that they reflect the diverse skills and talents of all employees as well as our performance standards.
- Recognize the diversity of society within and outside the organization, value its potential and use it profitably for the company or institution.
- make the implementation of the Charter the subject of internal and external dialog.
- publicly report annually on our activities and progress in promoting diversity and appreciation.
- inform our employees about diversity and involve them in the implementation of the charter.
We are convinced that living diversity and appreciating this diversity has a positive impact on society in Germany.